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SOUTHERN  AFRICA  :  REFLECTIONS  ON 
C~RRENT DEVELOPMENTS,  ECONOMIC 
ASSISTANCE  AND  REGIONAL  PERSPECTIVES. 
In reflecting with  you  to-day  on  European  Community 
relationships and policies towards  Southern  Africa,  I  should like 
to  begin  by  making  certain personal  observations  on  the  current 
situation in  the  re5ion,  and  in particular on  the apparent direction 
of South African policy.  White  South Africa and  the National 
Party Government  have  of course  been  more  than usually embattled, 
on  the  domestic  and  international  scene in recent months,  and it 
now  appears that an  accumulation  of connected  and  unconnected 
events is leading Pretoria towards  international positions  which 
have  potentially grave  consequence  for  South Africa itself and 
for  the  whole  Southern African region. 
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These  international  developments  come  at a  time  when 
significant  domestic  changes are about  to  be  initiated in  the 
apartheid  system.  The  recommendations  of  the  widely  publicised 
Riekert  and  Wiehahn  reports,  which  have  been  broadly accepted  ......  ~  .. - .. ...-- ....  ..., .... _..._  ....  ~  ... --"'""'""  .. ,. ..... __.."""..,,__..___.._,.,..., 
by  the  South  African  government,  represent  the  first  comprehensive 
statement of Pretoria's official response  to  Soweto,  apart  from 
--~--·~···.,.-~_  ........ .........,......_,.,...,~-~-
teargas  and  bullets.  They  seek  to  grapple  with  the  most  basic  -- .... -------,.,  .....  .,~--. 
in  the  white  economy.  If the  recommendations  of  the  two  commissions 
are  fully  implemented,  South  African  blacks  should  secure  evident 
benefits,  notably  through  the registration and  acceptance  of black 
trade  unions,  and  the abandonment  of statutory  job  reserVation 
by  race. 
But  however  radical  the  proposals  of Riekert  and  Wiehahn 
~-~'"'-
are  in  scrapping glaring examples  of discrimination,  both are  set 
rigidly within  the  existing South  African  constitutional  framework •  .  .  -~  .... -~.~~  ...  ,  ·.  ""~  .  - .. ·.,-- '•'·-.  '  ·-·  .  ~- ,._  ',..~--- ,._ .... 
They  are  not  seeking  to  destroy  the  system,  but  to  modernise  and 
streamline it,  and  make it work  more  efficiently.  Therefore  before 
turning  to  the  international issues affecting South  Africa,  it may 
be  as  well  to recall  that  the  response  in  the  country's black 
community  to  the  Riekert  and  Wiehahn  reports has  been  much  more 
cautious  than  that  of  white  liberals.  Thus  the  reaction  to  the 
Wiehahn  report  of  the  black  trade  unions,  and  of  the  ICFTU,  has 
been  guarded,with  the  existing unregistered unions questioning 
\ 
\what  criteria will  be  used  to  allow  them  to  register.  Then 
.;. 
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migrant  workers,  accounting  for almost  a  third of  the black  ---------.-... 
labour  force  may  still be  ineligible  for  union  membership,  and 
--~--- ~_,,.,.~-..  ~--~  ....... - _,_  . •  .  ..  ,. -·  """'"-.  ..-·--~--"'""· .-_  ..........  -~---·-,..,- ~-- _...,_.,....._"'<"__,..,.,.~.  ··------..---~·=-~- ~--, 
there  will  be  no  firm  move  to  eliminate  existing closed-shop 
arrangements,  currently used  by  white  trade  unions as  the  most 
effective  means  of  enforcing  job  discrimination in industry. 
Amongst  black  trade unionists,  further  cuspicions  foc~s on 
the  continuing  emphasis  which  both reports place  on  strer.g~hening 
government  controls. 
At  an  international level,  the  withdrawal  of secure 
supplies  of crude  oil  from  Iran,  and  the  entirely predictable 
failure  of any  other oil source  outside  the  spot market  to  make 
good  the  shortfall,  have  considerably diminished  the  benefits 
which  South  Africa derives  from  its somewhat  ambiguous  position 
within  the  Western  bloc.  Pretoria is no"'  preparing  to  "go it 
~-"'""'''-~ ...  ... . ._._,.._  ..  ~----···-~----·  --..... ,_,  ___  .,.~ ......  ~ .. --,=-..... -~  ..... 
alone"  on oil.  Plans are  going ahead  on  the  massive  investment  __ .,.  -~'""'"'""" ..  •""•'  -,.-.....--·· 
necessary  to  double  the  capacity of  the  existing oil-from-coal 
transformation plant.  A special  tax has  been  added  to  the  price  ... _  ...... ~.- ·----.;-·------------·-- . 
of  p~-~::ol  to help  pay  for it.  Legislation has  just been  passed 
making it an  offence  to  disclose  or publish any  information 
about  South  Africa's oil stocks  or  the  origin  of supplies,  thus  .. 
providing a  degree  of cover  for  the  deals  that are  now  being  made • 
.  ;. - 4-
Apart  from  oil supplies,  South Africa,  with its 
strategic and  other raw  materials,  appears  to be  coming  round 
to  the  view that  the balance of interdependence with  the  West 
.....  t"""""-"~"",._.....,.- ,..,_._  ----~  -~~  -~---·  >  ~  .,  - ~· c·- ·-·---~--.--~·•~·-~ ,,,,,.-,.- • --~····•~ ~•·--·~--- • ·•- -·-·~-·-•·  - ••••- ••·~~ ·---- > 
may  be  tipping in its favour..  The  fear of international sanctions 
·-·  .-·  ·:·-··-~ ''•"':- - -~··  -..  ·, 
has  been  lessened by  this shift in perspective,  by  the prospect 
of a  "softer" approach in  London,  and possibly of a  more  sympathetic 
administration  in Washington after 1980. 
Also  of relevance  to  South Africa is the  experience 
gained at close  quarters, and  over long years ,from  o~.fl~-~-v.~ng  the 
i_neffe:~ual, operation of sanctions against  ~hodesia,  and  in 
simultaneously learning with Salisbury  the  ways  to  circumvent  them. 
The  continuing buoyant  price of gold appears also  to  be  bolstering 
Pretoria's confidence in its capacity  to  weather any  storm at least 
as well as its enemies.  Pretoria seems at any rate more  willing 
to risk it  .. 
The  international pressure,  which it has  been possible 
to  place  on  South Africa over  the  Namibia  question,  has accordingly 
lost something of its leverage  ..  In  the  current deadlock,  Pretoria  --,...--
is choosing to  put  the  blame  on  the  bad  faith and  double-dealing 
...... ~  _____ ...._,._,.. .  .,....,....,, 
by  the  United Na tiona,  and particularly the  Weste.l:'~  __ !_ive,  thus 
further straining relations.  At  the  same  time,  much  of the momentum 
towards  an  international settlement in Namibia  has been lost,  and 
South Africa has  had  the  opportunity  to consider other options  • 
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In Pretoria,  the  government  is still trying  to ride 
out  the  information department  scandal,  both domestically and 
,,.,.~~~  ...  ,;..:;-;~ 
internationally.  The  revelations,  and  the abiding suspicion  that 
much  more  is being covered  up,  have  struck deep at  th~ South 
·-·---;!A--'~,.,_,.....,_,. .  ..,,,.,_,  ~··  •- "''>~·-.• ,_~ ..... ,-~.  ~-·~  ·•• ._,, •  .,  _ _._ .. 
Africans'  conscience.  In particular they  have  blurred  the 
Nationalists'cherished image  of themselves,  that  wh~tever else 
they  are a  straight and  upright  race,  ~hose leaders  mus~ in their 
turn  be  the  very  embodiment  of moral  rectitude.  Whilst  the liberal 
South  African press has  done  its utmost  to  force  the  government's 
resignation,  there  seems little prospect  of  this happening,  nor  that 
a  fresh  election would result in any  important  change  in  the  National 
Party's hold  on  the  country or its basic policies.  The  reaction  to 
the  washing of dirty linen is still to  try to  draw  the  curtains. 
Domestically,  with some  vicious  counter-smear  tactics against  the 
opposition,  and  threats  to  curb  'irresponsible'  press reporting,  this 
tactic  seems  to  be  succeeding.  Internationally,  the  effect of  the 
scandal  might  be  to  make  it more  diff~.cult  to  maintain  that sublime 
confidence  in the  inherent respectability and  righteousness,  which 
has  been  such a  shield against  international approbrium. 
And  for  years South Africa survived amidst  a  rising chorus 
of international  condemnation.  It has nevertheless been  allowed  to 
hang about  on  the periphery of  the  ~!estern family of nations like 
some  leprous relative,  at first indignantly denying  the  existence 
and  then  the  seriousness of  the  disease,  then attempting  to  treat 
the  symptoms,  whilst  protesting that it needed  time  and  sympathy 
to  effect a  cure.  For  the last thirty years  a  growing  embarassment, 
.;. - 6  -
South Africa has  been  tolerated,  but only  just,  because of past 
ties,  its continuing contribution to  the  family  economy,  and  the 
lingering hope  that it might  somehow  be  cleansed.  This position 
has  become  increasingly intolerable with South Africa's continuing 
failure  to  imp~ove at a  generally acceptable  pace,  and  increasing  , 
complaints about  the  smell  raised by  newly  inc'l.HpeYHlent ;- and  economi-
- ;::- -4 
cally important partners in the rest of Africa and  the developing 
world. 
The  manifestations of international abhorrence  for 
South  Africa's political and  economic  system  have  spread  to almost 
every  field  ..  One  of  the most  \troundi~g ,to  a  white  society,  where 
··~ ..  '-~=-"""'"-. '.  ·- . 
the  importance of  the  competitive sports ethic is enormous,  has 
been  the  sports boycott.  The  recent action by  France,  hitherto 
"--............ ~,-"  .- .  ..·• 
regarded as  one  of the  "least-prejudiced" of  the  Western nations 
in slamming  shut one  of the  few  remaining  doors  by  cancelling a 
provincial  rugby  tour,  a  golf tour,  and  in all probability  the 
Springbok  rugby  tour of France later this year,  has  rubbed salt 
deep  into  the  wounds..  More  pointedly,  ~t has also served as  an 
example  of  the gulf of incomprehensibility which still persists in 
the  mind  of large sections of the  South African white  population. 
There  are still those  sportsmen in South Africa,  who  believe  that 
external political criticism can  be  met  by  including  two,  or  three 
or  some  equally arbitrary number  of black,  or  coloured or  Asian 
players in this or  that  touring  team..  They  simply  cannot  understand 
that decent,  fellow  white  men  can  behave  towards  them  as  the  Western 
nations are now  doing..  For  many  white South Africans,  the  only 
possible explanation lies in a  resort  to  the popular and officially 
.;. '"~·  .  ~~~-~~-----------------
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encouraged  demonology  - the marxist and  communist  - influences 
~-----"'-"''* 
by  which  the  West  has allowed itself to  be infiltrated and 
undermined  .. 
Against  the background of all these  factors,  the  signs 
are  that  on  international issues  the  South African  gov~rnment no 
~ll"~_,.._,..,...,......,_ 
longer sees  the  need  to  continue  making  concessions and ac_cepting 
affronts.  It appears  to  have  concluded  that  i t_m~ay have little 
to  gain  from  a  further fruitless and humiliating dialogue with 
the  United Nations and  with  the West,  which are  incapable of 
\
stopping what it sees  ~s a  communist 
a  direct threat  to its own  security. 
matters into its own  hands. 
takeover of the  region  and 
It is in a  mood  to  take 
An  early indication of this was  a  speech made  in Zurich 
in March  by Mr.  Pik Botha,  the South African Foreign Minister,  in 
which  he  said  that Pretoria would  in  future  be  taking a  more 
independent line in international affairs..  Immediately afterwards 
came  the  government's  exposure  of the operations of tne  US 
surveillance plane,  which  has brought Pretoria's relations with 
the  West  to  a  particularly low  ebb  .. 
.. ------~----· 
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At  the  same  time  the  South African government  moved 
to  support  the  internal settlement elections in Rhodesia and 
to  encourage  the  emergence  of the  Muzorewa-Smith  coalition. It 
also began  to  back  further  away  from  international discussions 
on  Namibia,  and  moved  with  the  Democratic  Tumhalle  Alliance 
(DTA)  to  establish a  national assembly and  secure a  p6ssible 
internal settlement in Windhoeke 
These  moves  were  closely linked with  a  recent policy 
statement  by Mr.  Pik~~~-_!n the  South African parliament, 
It  II 
proposing  the  creatio~ of a  Southern African  communitye  Whilst 
"  _.,,,.,,  -'-.,  ..  ,,  ~,..,.,_  ~- •»  ·-~.,.c-~""'''""'~  ...  ,._. ..........  ,...~  ..  ""~' •  >  ,,__  .;  ··~  •• <•  •••  ~,.,.  ""'"-'""''""-~~<  ~,.-· .•~'- ---"<""'''<:'•- .... -., 
the  concept  was  couched  in rather  vague  and  general  terms,  the 
intention was  obviously  to  consolidate  a  South  African  sphere  of 
influence  which  would  embrace  Namibia and  Rhodesia,  as well  as 
other countries in the  region  such as  Malawi and  BLS  states. 
Suggestions have  also been made  in  the South  African press that 
this sphere  of influence would  extend  to Mozambique,  Zambia 
and  Zaire. 
I  have  sketched out  these recent  developments  in 
Southern Africa,  because  they have  a  certain bearing on  the 
Community's  approach  to Southern African  issues which is shaped 
in  two  distinct but related wayse ----------· 
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Firstly,  the European  machinery  for political  cooperation 
has  enabled our  governments in the EEC  member  states to  formulate 
common  political positions on  major issues in Southern Africa, 
as  they  do  in relation  to  other parts of the world.  Secondly 
the  Lome  Convention,which links  the nine  EEC  states with fifty-six 
-_..;.;p..n>~S"~>'  -~  --.  _,  ·- ·-·'  ' 
African, Caribbean  and Pacific  (ACP)  countries,  has 'established 
close working relations between  the European  Community,and  majority,-
r~ed  , Southern  African states in the  field  of economic 
cooperation and  tradee 
In  this context,  I  should like  to mention briefly 
the political approach of Europe  to  the  central issues of 
Southern Africa. Firstly the Nine  have  categorically  condemned 
'  -
the apartheid system in South Africa,  and  have  re!~f:!:.~-!2-~~-~..?.gl,l:~_z_? 
"internal settlements" in the  'f'ranskei  and  Bophutatswana.  They 
,__,.,.,. •.  ,c•,,~ __ ,.,.,,.,._,,..,.,  ~ 
have  supported  the  arms  embargo imposed by  the  United Nations 
~- ,....._._,~~- --·---<  .c.~  -·.  ~- •• --., ·- .,.._.,_,.,.,_,_~.,,  ... 
Security Council  in November  1977,  and  have  set up  a  Q..Q_<te..  __ 9f 
Conduct  for subsidiaries of European  companies operating in 
South Africa.  The  Community  believes that apartheid  ~ust be 
abandoned,  and  is committed  to  working  for  early fundamental 
change  by peaceful  means  in South Africae 
In  Rhodesia,  the Nine  have  given  their general  support 
to  United Nations resolutions,  calling for  elections under 
international supervision  involving all political groups  in that 
country.  In Namibia,  Europe  has  stood  firmly behind  the 
_..,.,  _  _...,.__.,--····- ~ ,..._ ___  ~----~---------------
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proposals of the  five  Western  members  of the Security 
Council  for an  international solution to  that country's 
constitutional  futuree 
The  positions adopted  in political  cooperati~~~ 
which are also  the subject of debate  and reflection  in the 
European Parliament,  have  in  turn helped  to  shape  the 
Community's  approach  to  economic  cooperation  ~lith  the  indepen-
dent majority-ruled states in Southern Africa..  Within  the 
.  . 
region,  Botswana,  Lesotho, Malawi  ,  Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Zaire 
and  Zambia are all memhers  of the Lome  Convention  which  was 
initiated in 1975e  The  current convention  expires early in 
1980,  and negotiations are  now  ~rell  advanced  for  the  conclusion 
of a  new  treaty,  which will probably  continue  in  force  to 1985. 
Angola  and  Mozambique  have  been participating as observers in 
the present negotiations,  and if they wish,would  be  eligible 
for  membership  of  the  new  convention.  Similarly Namibia and 
Zimbabwe  governmenta,which  were  acceptable  to  the  ACP  countries 
and  to  the EEC,  would  be  eligible for membership  of  the  new 
convention  .. 
Over the 1976-80  perio~ total  transfer  commitments  fi_'om 
the  Community  to  independent  countries in Southern Africa under 
Lome  and  other EEC  aid arrangements  will  be  of the  order of $  900  M  • 
.  ; .. - 11  -
These  transfers,which do  not include  the aid-programmes of the  .  .. 
individual Member  States for  the  region, take a  number  of different 
forms.  Firstly,  the  Community  provides  financial  and  technical 
support  for  the  ACP  countries'national development  programmes.  This 
support is assigned  to  development priorities and projects proposed 
by  the  recipient eovernments,  and much  of  this assistance in the 
Southern  African states goes  to rural  development  and agricultural 
production  schemes,  as well  as  economic  and  social  infrastructure~ 
and related training programmese  Then  a  regional  component  of Lome  , 
\..~::----,-~_--,.,,,  . 
which  will be  enlarged significantly in the new  convention,providea 
resources  for  joint development  schemes between  ACP  countries,  or 
between  ACP  states and  other developing_nationae 
A programme  for  the stabilisation of export  earnings 
(STABEX)  supports incomes  from  a  wide  range  of ACP  raw material 
~-- .o;...-""_  ·~"'"-""~~ 
exports,  mainly  tropical agricultural products,  during periods of 
depressed prices.  In  the new  convention a  modified  form  of this 
scheme  will be  extended  to various mineral  exports,which will be 
. 
of particular interest to major  copper-exporting countries  such 
as Zaire  and  Zambiae 
... 
An  industrial  cooperation chapter offers resources  for 
ACP  industrial projects with  financial  support·  from  the European 
Investment  Bank  and  technical help  through  the  ACP-EEC  Centre  for 
Industrial Development. 
.;. _____  ,,-k-..-.---·--~-~-"·--
- 12 -
Lome  also includes exceptional aid resources  to help 
ACP  countries overcome  natural  cataatro~hies and  economic 
emergencies  ,  a  scheme  which  has  been particularly  relevant 
and  valuable in  the Southern African context  •.  Outside Lome, 
\,.~~{'('~;ll'{"f>.,f,-;'h~~'QII'1L~,.-_.._,_,,~ 
there are  Community  provisions  for  food  aid,  for assistance  to 
non-governmental  organisations,  and  fo~ the  support of developing 
countries such as Angola  and  Uozambiqnc,  l<Yhich  are not as yet linked 
with  the  Community  under  an international treaty relationship. 
These latter states also  enjoy access  for  their exports 
to  Community  markets  on  _g_§P  terms,  while  the Lome  countries have 
free  and unrestricted entry  to_ the EEC  for  the great bulk of 
their  export  tradee 
I  have  described  these aid and  trade arrangements  in 
some  detail  ,  because ultimately  they offer the  instruments and 
resources,which  enable  the  Community  to provide  continuing asais-
...  _,_  "'-<. 1"..- ~"'  ~·-
tance  and  support  to  the  independent majority -ruled states of 
Southern Africa,  whether in terms  of development  programmes, 
market  opportunities,  or emergency aid needse  These are  the 
mechanisms  that will  be  renewed  and  replenished in the  new 
ACP  convention of the 1980s,which will  come  into  force  early 
next year  .. 
However  Lome  is not merely a  trade and aid agreement. 
'--"-·-
It is a  relationship  behr~en Europe  and Africa,  and  countries in 
...  ··-··~<o•.J'·--·"'..  .  ....  ·"'-···-~··  .,,.  ·""" 
the Caribbean  and  Pacific,which is governed  by  the provisions 
of an  international  treaty,and which  includes arrangements  for 
.;. - 13  -
continuing EEC-ACP  consultations at a  ministerial and official 
level. 
There  is also a  Consultative Assembly  and  Joint 
Committee  which  enable Members  of  the European Parliament  to 
meet  regularly with representatives of ACP  countries.  These  joint 
discussions,  and particularly those  in  the  Consultati.;e:Assembly 
offer  the  opportunity  for  a  wideranging exchange  of views  on 
development,  trade  and political issues of relevance  to  ACP-EEC 
relations.  Recently  these  joint discussions have  come  to  touch 
increasingly  on  the  problems of  Southern Africa,  and  indeed in 
December  1977 ,  the  Joint  Committee  with  some  fifty-six members  on 
each aide  met  in Maseru,  the capital of Lesotho,a small  enclave 
state within South Africa itself. 
At  this meeting  ACP  and  EEC  members  together agreed 
on  a  aeries of resolutions  on  major political issues confronting 
Southern Africa,  and  on  the urgent  economic  needs of frontline 
states.  Resolutions of this kind and  continuing  consultations 
with  the  ACP  governments  have  directed Community  assistance  to 
the  most  pressing requirements of the majority-ruled countries 
of Southern Africa. 
Thus  immediate  emergency  support  was  offered  to 
Lesotho  in the  transport sector  to  help  overcome  pressures 
for  the  recognition of the neighbouring  Transkei as an  independent 
stete~Under the  emergency programme  ,  substantial  relief  was 
provided  to  Botswana and  Zambia  to help resolve  transport problems 
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created  by Mozambique's application of international 'sanctions 
against Rhodesia.  Further emergency assistance is currently  on 
offer to  Botswana  to assist her overcome  ·.the  ravages  of  ·root 
and  mouth  diseas~ that have  adversely affected her important 
beef exports  which  enjoy  privileged access  to  the EEC  market 
under  Lome.  A special assistance programme  is currently under 
preparation for  Tanzania, \orhich  has recently carried an  e~ceptionally 
heavy  financial  burden  in securing a  greater measure  of peace 
and stability in East Africa. 
Again  under  the  Community's  emergency aid programme, 
~  - _, .... '  - .., 
an  increasing  degree  of support has been given  to  the urgent 
needs  of refugees in Southern Africa  through  the  good  offices of 
the  World  Food  Programmeoand  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for::  Refugees. 
Within  the past  month  provision of some  $  6.5  M.  has 
been  made  to  the  UN  High Commissionrfor specific humanitarian needs 
throughout  the  region,  but particularly for  the  requirements 
of Zimbabwe  and  South African refugees in Botswana,  Mozambique 
and  Zambia.  The  provision of esaential  food needs,  has 
also  come  to  form  an  increasingly important part of Community 
assistance  in Southern Africa,  and  especially in  the  current year 
when  there  have  been  quite  extensive  harvest  failures  throughout 
the  regione  Whenever  possible,  the  Community  is now  anxious  to 
support  inter-African  food  programmes.  For  example,  last year  the 
.. ; .. 
.. 
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Community  funded  the  export of maize  from  Zambia  to Zaire and 
Botswana;  this year when  Zambia is in particular difficulties. 
the  Commission  proposes  to  finance  white  maize  exports  from 
Malawi  and  Kenya  to  Lusaka.,  Requirements  of this kind underline 
the need  for  strengthening regional storage facilities. 
Amongst  the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, 
there is a  steadily increasing interest in the  implementation of 
regional projects \orhich  serve  to strengthen their economic  coope-
ration and  interdependence.  In  the  education and  training field, 
the  Community  is supporting institutions such as  the University 
of Botswana and  Swaziland, and  the_  UN  Institute for  Namibia,  whilst  the 
Commission  hopes  to play its part in the  development  of  railway 
and  telecommunication  training programmes  for  the Southern African 
countries. 
Increasing support has also  been  provided by  the 
Community  for regional  communication links in Southern AfricaJ 
which  include  a  new  airport in Maseru  to  permit  direct air 
communications  between Lesotho  and  independent  African states. 
Regional  road links financed  by  the  Community  include  the  important 
Botzam  route, which is Bots\'Tana 's sole means  of surface  communication 
with  Zambia  and  independent  Africa,  where  the  Community  is complementiDB 
work  initiated with  the  support  of  the  USAID  ..  Furth.er 
to  the north,  preliminary studies are being made  of potential  road~ 
communications  between  Zambia and  Angolao 
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Direct  telecommunication links are also being develo'ped  from 
Mozambique  to  Tanzania and  Zambia~again with Community assistance. 
Also  in a  regional  framework,  the  Community,together 
with  the United  Nations and  other  donors,  including the 
USAID  and  CIDA, ,is about  to  convene  a  m~H~t.ing l'Ji th the Angola,  Zaire 
and  Zambia  governments  to  further  these countries'joint interest, 
in  the revitalisation of  the  Benguela  route.  The  eventual 
reinstatement of this  railway  service  would  restore a  further 
degree  of normality  to  the  Angola  economy,  and  reestablish an  important 
outlet  for  Zaire  and  Zambia.  Then  on  the  other side of  the  continent, 
the  Community  would  hope  shortly to participate with Malawi, 
Mozambique  and  Zambia  in discussions  on  the  improvement  and  upgrading 
of their interconnected  transport  systems,  including the  development 
of  harbour  facilities at ports,such as Beira and Nacala. 
I  have  gone  into  the  Community's  development aid involve-
ment  in Southern Africa in  some  detail  to  give you  an  indication 
of the  form  and  scope  of the  EEC  assistance  to  the majority-ruled 
countries in  the  region.  This in turn is related to  my  earlier 
comments  on  the  South  African  scene.  For past  experience  would 
suggest  that if Pretoria persists in  the  imposition of"internal 
settlements"in Namibia  and  Rhodesia,without  regard  to  international 
obligations,  then  tensions in these  countries and  in the  frontline 
states could increase significantly in  the  months  ahead,  and  open 
the  way  to wider political and  military conflict.  At  the  United 
Nations,  this  would  inevitably lead  to  increased pressures  for 
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extensive sanctions against South Africa and  to enhanced 
demands  for  emergency support  from  the majority-ruled states 
in Southern Africa.  At  the  same  time,  these  developments  would 
also serve  to stimulate  the  Front Line States'interest and 
concern  in strengthening their regional  infrastructure and  programmes 
for  economic  cooperation.Sueh initiatives would  be  directed  towards 
reducing  their current dependence  on  South Africa,  rather  than  to 
forging  new  "community"  links,  as has  been suggested by Pretoria: 
For  the  EEC,  it is already apparent  that much  of the 
resources assigned  to  Southern  African  countries under  the  · new 
ACP  Convention  for  the 1980s  may  require  to  be  devoted  to  emergency 
needs,  and  also  to  regional  development  programmes,  which  help  to 
forge  closer economic  and political unity  between  the  independent 
majority-ruled states of Southern Africa.  These  countries are about 
to initiate important  policy discussions in this field,  and  the 
European  Community  would  intend  to  join with other donors  in giving 
sympathetic  consideration  to regional  economic  proposals  from  the 
Front  Line States. 
In this context,  I  would  wish  to  say how  much  we  have 
admired  the  steps  taken by  the  US  Agency  for  International  Development, 
and  in particular by  Mrs.  Butcher, to assist informed discussion in  .. 
this area by holding a  colloquium in vlashington last ..  Ta.nuary  on  the 
subject of development  needs and opportunities  for  cooperation in 
Southern Africa.  The  technical papers prepared  for  this colloquium 
and  the perspectives  opened  up  in  the discussions,  provide  valuable 
insights into  the possibilities for  balanced  regional  development 
amongst  the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa.The results of 
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this colloquium  should  make  a  valuable contribution to  the 
African  and  international  debate, and lay  the  basis  for 
concrete  development  programmes,which reflect  the  priorities 
and policy objectives of  the  African states.  It is my  conviction 
that  the  future  of regional  cooperation in Southern Africa lies 
here  with  the aspirations and  concerns of independent  Africa, 
rather  than  with  the  expansionary objectives of the apartheid 
administration in Pretoria. 
But  while  continuing apprehension  must  inevitably 
surround  recent South Africaninitiatives in Namibia and  Rhodesia, 
the  new  domestic policies and  approaches  advanced  by  the  Riekert  and 
Wiehahn  commissions  must  give  pause  for reflection,  and  perhaps 
for  some  mod~t optimisme  It is just possible  that  the  proposals 
and  new  directions initiated by  these  commissions,  and particularly 
those relating to  the  development  of trade unions  could  turn  out 
to  be  the  thin  end  of  the  social  wedge.  Certainly management  in 
South  Afr~ca will  now  be  encouraged  to  press its demands  for  more 
and  more  blacks  to  take  on  skilled jobs and  responsibilities - the 
need  for  which  was  the  main  economic  impulse behind  the Riekert 
and  Wiehahn  reportse  Certainly too,  the legal  confirmation and 
strengthening of black  trade  unions in South Africa will  open  up 
much  wider  social  and political perspectives  for  the  country's 
black population.  I  would  ventureto  suggest  that  these  developments 
within  South  Africa  could  become  o~ major  interest  to many  independent 
African etates,  which  are  searching for  a  peaceful  and  orderly 
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approach  to political  change  in Southern Africa. 
As  South African ministers have  been at pains  to 
emphasise,  the reforms  introduced by  Riekert  and  Wiehahn  owe 
much  to  international pressures,  and  in particular to  the different 
codes of business practice established by  North  American  and  West 
European  countries with substantial investments in South Africa, 
which  include  the Sullivan code  initiated by  American  companies,  as 
well  as  the EEC  code  and  similar schemes  originating in Canada  and 
Scandinaviae  This is a  development  of consequence,  for  the  impact 
of  these  measures  demonstrates  clearly that South Africa is ultimately 
.susceptible  to  the  pressures of international opinion. 
If this consideration is relevant  to  domestic  developments 
in South Africa,  it must  also apply in a  wider  regional  context, 
including Pretoria's actions in Salisbury and  Windhoeke  And  so 
in conclusion,  I  would  suggest  that  we  might  reflect for  a  little on 
the possibilities for peaceful  change,  which  could  be  carried  forward  in 
Southern Africa  through regional  initiatives and  pressures  emanating 
from  the majority-ruled states and  supported  by  the  international 
community. 